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f. 1
I'm very glad  to  have  been  invited  to  this year's  Convention 
of  The  Institute of  Scrap  Iron  and  Steel.  I  must  tell  you 
··  however  that it took  all  the  seductive  charm  which  this 
City's reputation exercises  upon  an  innocent  European  mind 
to  yield to your  suggestion  and  speak  about  the  "Future  of 
the  World  Steel  industry".  I  finally  thought  I  had  to  take  (f! 
up  the  challenge given  that here,  more  than  elsewhere,  to 
take  a  chance  is the  name  of  the  game~ 
I'm grateful  indeed  that you  asked  a  European  to  this 
Convention  because  in steel  as  in  so  many  other  sectors, 
part of our  history,  which  had  good  days  and  bad  days,  is 
common  history,  and  part of our  present goals  and  concerns 
are  common  goals  and  concerns.  Much  has  been  said in  Europe 
- sometimes  not without  apprehension  - about  the  growing 
openness  and  interest  on  the  US  side  for  the  Pacific  wor~d. 
It is true  that  Japan  and  some  other  Asian  nations  have 
become  impor~ant economic  areas.  The  European  Community 
has  also developed its relationship with  them,  notwith-
standing  the  longer distances. --------------
In  the  meantime  however  the  US  and  the  EC  remain  very 
important  economic  partners  and  both  have  a  strong mutual 
interest in  each  other's  economic  health  and  political 
stability.  In  1982  the  US  had  a  trade  surplus 
of  more  than  $  10 billion,  slightly more  than  $  5  billion 
of  which  came  from  the  agricultural sector. 
As  far  as  steel is  concerned,  the  United  States  became  a 
net  importer  of steel  in  1959  after  the  strikes  w~ich 
made  it necessary  for  the  American  industry  to  look  for 
their  supply  outside  of this country.  At  that  time 
the  European  steel  industry seemed  in  the  best position 
to  supplement  the shortfall of American  steelmakers  :  in 
1961  they  provided  more  than  60  % of  the  imports  of  Steel 
Mill  Products  into  the  United  States.  Except·for  a  slight 
rebound  in  the  1973-74  period,  this percentage has 
progressively  gone  down  and  reached  25  % in  1980,_ when 
the  Japanese  share,which  was  below  20% in 1960,reached 
more  than  38  %. 
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From  that  time  on  steel became  part of  our  common  history. 
·"  More  particularly,  both  our  industries  went  through  the 
fat  years  in  the  beginning  of  the  seventies  in  a  .slightly 
euphoric  and  care-free  mood  without  noting  the  signals  df 
a  fundamental  structural  change  which  was  progressively 
taking shape.  In  this respect  a  comparison  can  be  drawn 
with  the  structural  changes  which  have  been  taking  place 
in  energy  consumption  since  the  successive oil  shocks. 
Notwithstanding declining real  energy  prices  spec~fic 
consumption  stays  lower,  because  of  the  adaptation  which 
has  been  carried out in terms  of  energy  saving  and  shifting 
to  other  sources  of energy.  The  relationship between  the 
use  of  energy  and  the  increase of industrial  production 
will  probably  never again  be  what it w-as  some  years  ago. 
In  the  same  way  it can  be  said that  the  importance  of Steel 
has  changed dramatically over  the past  20  years,  both  as 
regards  consumption  and  production.  In  the  whole  of  the 
industrialized world  the steel  industry  today  faces  a  major 
challenge  to its survival  and  development. ------------------------
Steel-consuming industries have  constantly sought  to 
either  make  better use  of  the steel  component  in  their 
products  or  to substitute steel  by  other  products, 
especially  alloy  metals  (alumiriiurn)  and synthetic 
materials- such  as  fibr.e.  glass.  The  volume  of steel 
used  in  the  automobile  industry has  decreased  by  10  % 
per  vehicle  in  the  second  half of  the 1970's,  and  now 
accounts  for  68  % of  the  weight  of  an  automobile.  If 
synthetic materials  were  used  in all  the  applications 
possible  this  could be  reduced .to  50  %.  Fibre  glass 
has  also  replaced steel  in many  applications  in  con-
struction. 
Mor~over,  export markets  are  becoming rare,  since  Japan 
and  new  producers  are best placed  to  cover  the  demands 
of  the developing countries.  Significant examples  of 
this  can  be  found  in  the  Middle_  East,  in  Asia  and  in 
Latin  American  countries.  In  the  longer  term  these  are 
likely  to be  the  fastest-growing  markets.  The  IISI has 
forecast  an  average  annual  growth  rate in  consumption  from 
1982-1990 of  5  % for  developing countries,  compared  to 
1.5 % for  ~he developed  countries. 
-
4. 
--In  a  world  steel market  which  has  been  stagnant  since 
1974  there  have  already been  important structural  changes 
in  the  market  shares  of  supplying countries.  All  the 
traditional  producers  have  had to  make  sacrifies. 
In  1974  the  European  Community  accounted  for  36  % of 
in steel, 
international  trade AJapan  for  a  similar  amount  and 
North  America  for  8  %.  In  1982  all  these  shares  had 
fallen  - the  Community  to  26  %,  Japan  to  29  % and  North 
America  to  5  %.  The  market  had·been  taken  by  other 
Western  European  countries,  which  increased  from  7  % to 
12  % and  especially the  developing countries  which 
literally exploded  from  5  % to  19  %. 
The  trend  of  production has  been  the  same,  with. the 
3  great  trading partners having decreased  their  shares 
of  world  production which  itself had  fallen  by  9  % in 
the  same  period. 
5. 
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~ It is clear  that the effects of  these striking changes 
in  the  situation of  the  steel  industry have  been 
exacerbated by  the  fact  that  they  took  place  in  the 
context of  a  world  economy  which  \'las  badly  shaken  by 
the  double  oil crisis which  also  had  negative  effects 
on  all other  sectors of  the  economy. 
In  such  conditions  stagnant market,  increase  in capacity 
in certain regions  it is little wonder  that  there have 
been  tensions  in  world  steel  trade.  These  tensions  have 
led the  principal  trading partners  in  1977  to  adopt the 
so-called  OECD  Consensus  on  burden sharing  and  have  also 
led  the  Community  to  adopt  a  policy of restructuring which, 
in  accordance  with its international  obligations,  was 
designed  to  avoid shifting  the  burden to  others.  This  can 
be  clearly seen  from  the  fact  that the  Community's  share 
of world  trade  has  fallen  more  than  any  other  supplier. 
6. --------------------------------------
This  consensus  reached by  all  the  industrialized countries 
was  based  on  a  common  analysis  of  the situation in  the 
steel sector  overcapacity  and  lack  of  com?etitiveness of 
many  steel mills  on  the  supply  side  and  sober  prospects 
as  far  as  overall steel  consumption  is  concerned.  And 
then  something  happened  which  happens·all  too  rarely in 
international relations  :  all  the  OECD  countries  decided 
that  they  had  a  common  enemy  which  was  the international 
steel crisis. 
To  overcome  that crisis,  measures  had  to  be  taken  by  each 
of  them,  but  these measures,  which  had  to be  adapted  to 
individual  situations,would not shift the  burden  of  the 
restructuring  to  the  other partners.  Traditional  trade-
flows  should not  therefore be  upset.  It was  agreed  that 
a  time  span  of at least five  years  would  be  necessary. 
In reality  and  largely because  of  the  overall  economic 
recession,  this  period of  adjustment  and  restructuring 
will have  lasted at least some  two  years  more  than  was 
initially foreseen. 
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The  implementation  of  the  OECD-consensus  on  the  US-side 
led  to  the  so-called  TPM  (trigger-price-mechanism).  Our 
feeling is  that this  system did  not  work  satisfactorily 
:.•. 
and  had  eventually  to  be  withdrawn,  not  so  much  because 
of its inherent  fl~ws as  because  of  a  rather injudicious 
application  of its parameters. 
On  the  European  side  we  established  a  system of  Basic  Prices 
based  on  the  costs of  the  most  efficient producers  in 
in  market  economy  countries.  As  provided  for  in the  GATT, 
a  breach  of  the  Basic  Prices  could be regarded  as  prima 
facie  evidence  of  dumping.  Anti-dumping  action could 
however,  only  be  taken if there  was  also  evidence of 
injury caused  by  these  imports. 
As  an  alternative  to  the basic price system,  exporting 
countries  cou·ld  negotiate  Arrangements  with  the  Community 
<  .. 
with  a  view  to maintaining their traditonal  trade  flows. 
These  Arrangements  offer substantial benefits  to  exporting 
~·. 
countries  :  .. 
I they  give  exporters  price  advantages  compared  to  the 
basic prices; 
exporters  have  a  penetration margin  of  4  % or  6  % 
under  the delivered prices  of  Community  producers; 
our  producers  are  not  allowed  to  align  their prices 
of  imports  from  Arrangement  countries; 
exporters  have  security  from  the  application of our 
anti-dumping  laws,  so  long  as  they  respect  the 
Arrangements. 
In  return,  the exporters  exercise  a  certain discipline 
in quantities  exported by  not exceeding  their traditional 
share  of  the  Community  market. 
The  Arrangem~nts have  proved  sufficiently attractive for 
15  countries  (4  EFTA,  6  other market  economy  and  5  East 
European  countries)  to have  concluded  Arrangements  with 
u~ since  1978. 
9. 10.  ~ 
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When  finally  the  trigger price mechanism  collapsed  in 
· ·  the  US, American  producers  filed  new  anti-dumping  and 
countervailing suits against  the  European  producers. 
After  long negotiations  however  an  agreement  on  Community 
steel  export limits  to  the  United  States  was  finally 
signed.  In  exchange  for  the  withdrawal  of  the  anti-
dumping  and  countervailing charges,  the  European 
Community  pledged  to  limit exports  of  ten  product 
categories  of steel  to market  share  allowances  based  on 
projected  apparent  consumption  in  the  U.S. 
Having,  for  many  years,  consistently rejected  the 
,· 
possibility of quantitative restrictions,  the  fact  that 
we  eventually  decided to  embark  on  such  a  course  has 
raised questions.  It was  not  an  easy decision for  us, 
nor,  I  believe,  for  the  US  administration.  My  assess-
rnent  however.is  that it represents  one  of  the  best examples 
of crisis management  between  the  US  and  the  EC.  The  depth 
and  nature  of  the crisis  through  which  this sector is 
goinq  left us  no  choice  :  ignoring realities could only 
have  led us  into  a  major  political c.risis,  which,  I  am 
pleased  to  say,  we  were  eventually  able  to  avoid. ----·-------- ----------·---·-----
As  to  the  effectiveness  of  the  Arrangement,  the  European 
side  has  strictly abided  by  its terms  :  our  exports  went 
down  in  1983  by  over  30  %.  By  respecting  our  undertakings 
we  believe  that  we  have  made  our  contribution to 
establishing  a  situ~tion which  would  allow  US  industry  to 
restructure.  Understandably,  therefore,  we  are  more  than 
a  little concerned  when  we  see  that  our  place  has  been 
taken  by  other  third countries  which,  with  the  exception 
of  Japan,  have  increased their  exports  by  over  40  %. 
Some  tend  to  consider  that this  calls  into question  the 
very objective of  the  Arrangement.  Clearly,  these nations 
have  the right to export,  but need  to be  subject to  the  same 
international rules  as  all of us. 
Our  problems  with  our  American  friends  in ·the  steel sector 
did not,  however,  stop entirely with  the  Arrangement. 
You  will  all,  of  course,  know  that last July  the  US 
Administration  adopted  safeguard measures,  in  th~ form  of 
quantitative restrictions  and  increases  in tariffs,  on 
special  steels.  We  did  not  accept  that the measures  were 
justified under  the  GATT  and  so  we  requested consultations 
with  the  US  with  a  view  to obtaining compensation  for  them. 
Unfortunately,  although  we  twice  extended  the  GATT  deadline 
for  these  consultations,  the  US  side  has  not felt able  to 
make  us  a  compensation  offer  which  we  could regard  as  being 
acceptable. 
11.  ~ 
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.  .. :.· We  have  therefore  in  the last  few  days  notified to  the 
GATT  a  list of products  on  which  we  will  make  compensatory 
withdrawals.  In other words,  increase tariffs and  apply 
quotas  on  certain U.S.  exports  to  the  EC. 
Our  views  on  the  justification for  these measures  have 
been  vindicated by  the  fact  that even  in  the first half 
of  1983,  before  the  measures  were  taken,  US  production 
of v.s.  Specialty Steels 
and  consumpt~onAwere already rising rapidly  from  the 
trough  of  1982  and  by  the  third quarter of  1983  were 
back  at their  traditonal  levels. 
As  I  said before  the  OECD  consensus  and subsequent 
measures  a~  well  as  the  EC-US  Arrangement  resulted  f~om 
a  common  firm belief that steel  industries  in all  the 
industrialized :countries  needed  a  period of painful 
adjustment,  the  burden  of  which  shoulu not be  shifted 
on  to  each other's shoulders.  We  fully  appreciate  the 
efforts  made  ~n the  US  as  signalled by  the  closing of 
uncompetitive mills  and  the reduction of overcapacity. 
~ 
12.  ~ The  European  industry is presently in  the  same  process 
of  adjustment.  Between  1974  and  1983  employment  has 
fallen  by  over  one-third  from  800.000  to  less  than 
480.000  thousand  jobs  and  production  has  decreased  from 
155  million  tons  to  111  million. 
Moreover,  the  Member  States  of  the  Community  accepted  an 
Aids  Code  the  purpose  of  which  was  to  eliminate all  aid 
programmes  to  the  steel  industry.  The  basic principle 
of  this  Code  is that  no  aid will  be  given  tb  the  European 
steel  industry after  1985  and  aids  to  cover  operating 
losses  are  already prohibited.  This  code  is considerably 
more  restrictive than  the  GATT  subsidies  Code  which 
governs  such  matters  at international  level. 
For  the  current  aid  programmes  the  European  Commission  has 
conditioned its approval  to  the  reduction of  capacity. 
Present restructuring plans  amount  to  about  30 million  tons 
reduction  of  capacity. The  statistical presentation of  thes~ decisions  don't 
do  justice to  the  numerous  personal  and  collective 
tragedies  which  they  provoke.  And  the  overall  economic 
recession  made  the  adjustments  even  more  painful,  as  not 
much  hope  for  new  job creation existed.  Contrary  to 
happening 
what. is  /\  in  the  US  today,  the  outlook  in  Europe 
hasn't become  rosier yet. 
The  Community  for  its part is however  deeply  committed 
to  the objectives  defined  in  common  in  the  OECD 
as 
consensus,  as  painfulAtheir realisation may  be.  But it 
must  be  emphasized  that  the efforts  and  sacrifies of the 
Community  alone  wou~d not  be  sufficient to  solve  a 
problem  which  is  commonly  recognised  as being  world  wide 
or  even  to  solve  our bilateral difficulties.  Other 
producers,  and  in  the  first place  the  US,  have  to  accept 
the  same  effort,  discipline  and  sacrifices if we  are  to 
have  a  lasting return  to  normal ·trading relations  in this 
field after 1985. 
14. 
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